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Abstract 
 
Waiting is a part of everyday life. It is often characterised by its banality: its 
quotidian nature. Time spent waiting can be seen as boring, wasted, and at times 
painful or distressing, or conversely hopeful or full of potential. The experience 
of Motor Neurone Disease (MND) reveals a population for whom (limited) 
time has a significant impact on quality of life. This paper will argue that waiting, 
for people with MND, exemplifies the relationship between time, power and 
agency. In so doing we can better conceptualise the manifold ways in which time 
and waiting are experienced through choosing to wait, enforced waiting and 
waiting when time is known to be ‘running out’. Through a sociological analysis 
of multiple forms of waiting three key themes emerged that characterised 
waiting as powerlessness; emotional (as a form of production), and; alternating 
as an experience between patience and endurance. This paper challenges the 
passivity, universality and ambivalence ascribed to waiting and instead argues 
that waiting affects the ‘time left’ for people with MND. It also offers up a lens 
through which to view time through the multiple textures and tensions of 
waiting produced through chronic illness. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper explores waiting in a particular context: having Motor Neurone 
Disease (MND). This paper forms a prolegomenon to understanding 
experiences of MND and how this intersects with time and power. This 
study reveals multiple forms of waiting: waiting and seeing; enforced 
waiting; and waiting when time is ‘running out’. These modes of waiting 
are experienced within the context of temporalities in conflict. As such, 
‘waiting’ comes to represent ‘time-stilling’ (Anderson, 2004, see also 
Bissell, 2007) whilst MND involves the continuous and, frequently, rapid 
deterioration of the body. A focus on the phenomenological experience 
of being diagnosed with this terminal condition and the consequences 
of waiting for (in)appropriate support allows us to reconsider theories of 
waiting which have often been constructed within a view of time being less 
limited (Bissell, 2007). As the experience of having MND has not previously 
featured in discussions on waiting and time and this paper provides the 
opportunity to view waiting through the lens of MND. Through using 
MND as a case study we offer up chronic illness as a medium through 
which to think about the precarity of time and often juxtaposing forms 
of waiting. 
 
Within modernity, time has been positioned as our enemy, limiting progress 
and shaping all activity; time constrains and creates possibility in 
everyday life. Our lives are structured through frameworks of time and 
often involve periods of waiting characterised as tedious or wasted time. 
Waiting has been interrogated in the academic literature, often positioned 
as inevitable, with the wait-er seen as passive and non-productive. Bournes 
and Mitchell (2002) argue waiting is a ‘common human experience’ and that 
everyone’s lives involve waiting in some way or another, similarly Bissell 
 
 
maintains that ‘waiting is a universal experience’ (Bissell, 2007: 283). 
Waiting can be experienced in manifold formats, from quotidian forms of 
waiting such as waiting for the phone to ring or the bath to run (Bissell, 
2007), to more exceptional forms such as waiting for the onset of labour 
(Eri et al., 2010) or infertile couples waiting to adopt a child (Sandelowski 
et al., 1991). For Fujita (2002) waiting is to be understood in two ways, 
firstly in terms of ‘what is waited for’ and secondly ‘how we wait’; he argues 
that ‘how we wait’ depends on ‘what is waited for’. Thus waiting for a kettle 
to boil is significantly different to waiting for a terminal diagnosis, 
for example. One is time to be whiled away, whilst the other demands 
endurance. In this paper we focus on this emerging notion of waiting as 
endurance or ‘raw’. 
 
Waiting has, generally, been overlooked by sociological study (Auyero, 
2011; Bissell, 2007 see also Schwartz, 1974). Within work exploring 
temporality, there has been limited focus on experiential waiting in relation 
to a terminal diagnosis or chronic illness, a mode of waiting that is not 
ambivalent, cannot be avoided and must be endured (Sutton et al., 2011). 
Sutton et al. (2011: 32) refer to this process of forced waiting and endurance 
as ‘raw waiting’. 
 
As waiting becomes recognised as (at times) the experience of endurance, 
power becomes visible as a force shaping waiting; allowing exploration of 
why we wait and whether we have a choice in waiting (Fujita, 2002). The 
body of literature on waiting and temporalities allow us to explore scales of 
time and scales of waiting. Auyero (2011) and Sutton et al. (2011) bring to 
the fore the relationship between waiting and power or domination, arguing 
that having to wait long periods of time can amplify powerlessness and 
weakness on the part of those who wait. In this sense perhaps waiting is 
articulated as passive and in relation to waiting with a chronic illness this is 
particularly salient as whilst participants in this study often felt a lack of 
control or powerlessness in waiting, they were also able to assert agency in 
waiting. As Sutton et al. (2011) note, waiting is for the weak, those who 
have no choice but to wait. The powerful may be able avoid waiting; they 
have the resources and the potential to end it (Schwartz, 1974). Most people 
have the ability to avoid ambivalent waiting through technologies that exist 
to avoid waiting such as kindles, mobile phones, computers and televisions. 
Raw waiting is of a different sort, much more associated with a kind of 
structurally enforced powerlessness. If waiting is a product of modernity 
then raw waiting, or waiting that must be endured without avoidance, is 
a product of the structural and power inequalities produced through 
modernity. As Bourdieu writes, modernity has made way for the: 
 
exercise of power over other people’s time both on the side of the powerful 
(adjourning, deferring, delaying, raising false hopes, or conversely, rushing, 
taking by surprise) and on the side of the ‘patient’ as they say in the medical 
universe, one of the sites par excellence of anxious, powerless waiting. 
(Bourdieu, 2000: 228 cited in Auyero, 2011) 
 
Conversely waiting, boredom and time have been explored in terms of their 
potentiality, their capacity to create and anticipate as temporal spaces 
within which social meaning can be created and experienced and has the 
capacity to challenge notions of waiting as passive. As such waiting has the 
potential to be seen as agentic and those who wait as active producers of 
social meaning (Barbalet, 1999). 
 
Emerging from our analysis of waiting are a series of agentic practices 
that challenge notions of waiting as a passive state. Choosing to seek medical 
help, receiving a diagnosis and approaching social services for further support  
punctuates waiting for bad news but critically evidence productivity and activity  
on the part of those who wait. This paper will explore these 
 
 
multiple scales of waiting in terms of power, emotionality, and patience and 
endurance. 
 
Waiting in health and illness 
 
Waiting in relation to health and illness has been given significant attention 
in the literature. In general these analyses have focused on relatively routine 
but protracted waiting times in waiting rooms (Akerstrom, 1997), the fear 
emanating from an unwanted diagnosis and the impacts that these can have 
on patients (Bishop, 2013), and waiting for a ‘serious’ diagnosis (Giske and 
Gjengedal, 2007; Thorne et al., 1999), or transplant (Brown et al., 2006; 
Yelle et al., 2013). Focusing on waiting rooms generally demonstrates 
waiting as passive, however some studies (such as Yelle et al., 2013) 
argue that waiting is not passive but instead is agentic through emotion, 
for example the experiences of hope or of fear for example. 
 
Hope is central to many studies on waiting in relation to illness and in 
particular, diagnosis. Yelle et al.’s (2013) study into narratives of waiting 
for a lung transplant explored how significant periods of waiting affected 
participants’ wellbeing, mental health, and everyday lives as they had to be 
prepared at any moment to be called in to be transplanted. Patients were 
partnered with mentors who had ‘come through’ the process and who 
gave hope as to what their futures could be like. Critically, the negative 
experience of waiting was recognised and mitigated through mentoring in 
this example. Tying in to what Gaspirini writes (1995), waiting for a lung 
transplant was endured by emphasising the prospect of having functioning 
lungs at the end. Similarly, Bournes and Mitchell’s (2002) study into 
waiting in critical care discussed hope and anticipating restoration to good 
health as key to coping in the period of waiting. Ezzy (2000) discussed hope 
and time in the context of HIV illness narratives and found that positive 
successes in managing HIV led to increased hopefulness and planning for 
the future, that the potentiality of long periods of good health restored a 
sense of identity. Good health is a process that requires effort (though effort 
does not always result in good health). Hopefulness in waiting, then, is an 
agentic practice that challenges the assumption of the passive wait-er. 
 
A return to good health is a way of reducing waiting times too. This 
reinforces normative meanings around health and illness as shorter waiting 
times for a lung transplant are, of course, desirable and denotes priority. As 
Zerubavel (1987: 345) argues ‘‘The rapidity with which doctors and nurses 
attend some patients, for example, is usually indicative of their relatively 
high priority to them as emergencies . . .’’ the converse being that long and protracted periods 
of waiting can be understood, by those waiting, as being 
of low importance or low priority. Within contexts of health and lack 
of resources, organs for example, having quicker access to those resources 
and a short wait may denote importance or high priority. Where those 
are able to pay to wait shorter times then waiting may be felt by those 
who can’t as being of low priority or of low status. Being made to wait, 
as Zerubavel explains, ‘is often regarded as a symbolic display of degradation’ 
(Zerubavel, 1987: 345). This could refer to degradation in terms 
of status but perhaps could also be understood in terms of physical 
degradation, degradation of health and of the body. However, Zerubavel 
(1987) doesn’t focus on the fact that protracted periods of waiting can be 
experienced not as an indication of low status or degradation of the 
wait-er but as a result of the difficulty in diagnosing particular conditions 
or perhaps the pressure and constraints placed on medical professionals to 
rule out other possible conditions and give accurate and reliable diagnoses 
with haste. As will be seen later, this is particularly salient when it comes to 
the diagnosis of MND which can often be drawn out, complicated and 
precarious. 
 
 
 
Like Zerubavel (1987), Bissell (2007) describes normative frameworks 
built around speed, haste and productivity as entrenched in Western 
individualist understandings of what is good and preferable. Activities 
undertaken with speed, and in good time, can denote importance, high 
status, priority and necessity. Certainly Parsons’ discussion of ‘the sick 
role’ speaks of restoration to health with haste in order to be productive 
and legitimate (Jutel, 2009). A good patient, according to Parsons’ (1951), 
remains absent while ill so as not to infect others, and rests to ensure a 
speedy recovery. They do not place undue pressures on the healthcare 
system, as their recovery becomes their own moral concern. Such a role 
may indeed work with infectious conditions. Parsons’ work has contributed 
to a culture of patience within healthcare where waiting one’s turn is 
approved of. This approach is less useful with chronic conditions 
(Nettleton, 2006) or where there is no cure (or return to work), but 
speedy diagnoses is still key to optimising illness management, and ensuring 
timely access to necessary services, treatments and support (Jutel, 2009 
see also Bell, 2014). 
 
A diagnosis can, at times and in certain circumstances, be understood or 
experienced as a reward and a relief to the patient, ending one element of 
waiting. As Jutel (2009: 278) notes, being given a diagnosis ‘gives permission 
to be ill’. Medical professionals have the power to deliver diagnoses 
and the power to diagnose sets them apart, imbuing them with ‘medicine’s 
authority’, a form of superiority that makes the patient relatively inferior or 
powerless (Jutel, 2009, see also Freidson, 1972). The power to deliver diagnoses in a timely 
fashion is also the potential power to open-up access 
to other services necessary to manage ill health and chronic conditions, 
which is instrumental to quality of life. 
 
Similarly, waiting for necessary services can be understood in terms of 
‘time wasted’ and highlights the structural affects of waiting (for example 
‘normal’ waiting for appointments and referrals). Abbott and Carpenter’s 
(2014) study into transition management for young men with Duchenne 
Muscular Dystrophy (DMD)1 outlined that often parents would see 
transition services as ‘wasting precious time’ as families had to wait 
for these services. Time was understood by participants and families and 
constructed as ‘precious’ by parents who were aware that ‘there was not 
much time left’ and was structured by organisations’ enforced waiting 
thereby rendering time waiting as ‘wasted’ (Abbott and Carpenter, 2014: 
1201). Ultimately Abbott and Carpenter (2014) question the efficacy of 
services that are being mapped onto lives that experience specific 
or unique scales or frames of time. It will be seen that services built for 
normative understandings of what the life-course is, or should be, were 
often incompatible for people with MND and arguably for those with 
other chronic and life limiting illnesses. 
 
Waiting, Bissell (2007) surmises, results in a juxtaposed feeling of 
temporalities in conflict; the slowness and frustration of waiting, juxtaposed 
with the continuously moving, and often ‘fast’, nature of everyday life. As 
will be explored through MND, this conflict can have devastating effects 
when ‘time left to live’ is ‘running out’. 
 
Motor neurone disease 
 
MND is an umbrella term used in the UK to describe a range of conditions 
that affect the motor neurones in the brain leading to gradual paralysis of 
the body (Ba¨umer et al., 2014). The most common type is Amyotrophic 
Lateral Sclerosis (ALS). Other more rare types include Primary Lateral 
Sclerosis (PLS) and Progressive Muscular Atrophy (PMA), though many 
 
 
people do not receive a more specific diagnosis than MND. 
 
MND is a terminal condition in all cases, and many people reach end of 
life within two years of diagnosis (Motor Neurone Disease Association 
(MNDA), 2015), although a small number survive beyond 10 years and 
for some, then, it shares the characteristics of a chronic condition. Brown 
(2003) described MND as sitting astride the boundary between chronic and 
terminal illness with people facing (possibly years of) care strategies and 
then end of life after an unspecified (but short) amount of time. Around 1 in 
50,000 (Hoppitt et al., 2011) people have MND in the global population 
and there are roughly 5000 people in the UK with the condition today. 
It is not understood what causes MND though there is thought to be a 
genetic basis in around 10% of cases (MND Scotland, 2012). 
 
The road to diagnosis is a fairly long and circuitous one involving a series 
of tests. A person must fail each test (that is, no other explanation for the 
loss of muscle strength can be identified) before they are diagnosed with 
MND (MNDA, 2015) and thus waiting for the diagnosis is punctuated by 
some relief as they discover they haven’t had a stroke, they don’t have 
Multiple Sclerosis, they don’t have Muscular Dystrophy and so on. 
However, once they have their diagnosis there is no cure and no treatment. 
 
Muscle weakness or fasciculation in MND is first detected via fairly 
minor symptoms; small disruptions to daily activities. For example, 
increased experiences of tripping, tired feet or slurred speech are noticed 
at first (Gordon, 2013). Symptoms gradually increase in incidence and 
severity over weeks and months. As paralysis develops, people struggle to 
cough (Young et al., 2011) breath, eat, talk, walk, sit unaided, turn over in 
bed and fine motor movement can be affected too (Gordon, 2013). There 
are broadly speaking two forms: bulbar onset and spinal onset. The disease 
has a quick progression and although prognosis is discussed at diagnosis, 
so much variability in presentation makes it difficult to predict how the 
symptoms will develop (MNDA, 2015). 
 
MND has been conceptualised, academically, in terms of biography and 
disruption to identity and sense of self (Bury, 2001; Locock et al., 2009). 
Ferrie and Watson (2015) have looked at the notion of MND as a disability, 
and Pavey et al. (2013) have looked at phenomenological accounts of 
receiving a diagnosis of MND. However, MND has not been understood in 
terms of temporality, waiting and its implications. 
 
Research methods - Recruitment, sample and analysis 
 
The material explored in this paper is taken from a study funded by MND 
Scotland which aimed to explore the health and social care needs of people 
with MND and their families in Scotland. Forty people with MND and 
their families were involved in interviews (roughly 10% of people living in 
Scotland with MND). MND Scotland wrote to their contact list inviting 
families to participate. We did not see the contact list, and we did not 
disclose to MND Scotland which families had contacted us directly for 
more information. Pseudonyms were used and other identifiers were 
removed (e.g. location). Interviews occurred between 2010 and 2012 and 
families were visited between 1 and 4 times. This quasi-longitudinal 
approach allowed rapport to build and the study to follow the progression of MND. In addition 
five focus groups with family members who had lost 
someone who had MND were conducted across Scotland. Featured quotes 
include whether it derives from the person with MND or their relative to aid 
clarity. However, we also felt and participants felt that the phenomenological 
experiences of waiting with MND were pervasive not just for the person 
with the condition but for their loved ones, carers and family members 
 
 
and so their narratives provide meaningful parts of that lived experience. 
Ethical permission was granted by the University of Glasgow’s internal 
review board in 2010. 
 
Phenomenology is a philosophy and research approach that aims to 
explore the lifeworld of each participant. It is concerned with a thorough 
engagement with each participant’s perspective to gain rich and original 
insight around a particular shared experience (van Manen, 2007), in this 
case, of living with MND and as such this data was analysed by examining 
the phenomenological experiences of those participants. Interviews 
began with the question ‘Tell me how it started’ and participants were 
then given the freedom and space to supply rich phenomenological detail 
as they discussed aspects of health, social care and the nuances of living 
life with MND. Waiting was not initially a key theme to emerge within 
the data until it was looked for, and then it pervaded all interviews, all 
stages of the condition, and the full range of services and support 
networks. 
 
The initial discussion in most interviews was around the experience of 
diagnosis and waiting. The wait between first seeing a GP and receiving 
a diagnosis of MND did not exceed 24 months. Some informants had 
difficulty discerning exactly how long they waited before reporting early 
symptoms to their GP, others were more precise: 13 reported symptoms 
to their GP immediately, 10 within three months of noticing symptoms, 
three waited up to six months, three up to 12 months and two just over 
one year. Advice from others, painful symptoms or restricting symptoms 
were most likely to trigger an early visit to a GP. It is essential to note, here, 
that narratives presented reflect the experiences, thoughts and feelings of 
participants with MND and their families and loved ones. We did not formally 
interview health or social services for the purposes of this study. As 
will be seen there were multiple intersecting forms of waiting being experienced 
by participants and therefore some forms of waiting, such as waiting 
for a diagnosis, for example, were reflected on by some in retrospect and by 
others who were involved in waiting at the time of interview, such as waiting 
for home services. The complexity of these myriad forms of waiting brought 
to the fore the mosaic experience of time for these participants and their 
families. 
 
Key findings 
 
We have argued that the diagnosis of MND is not a straightforward process; 
as there is no ‘test’ (MNDA, 2015) often it is a diagnosis by omission. 
The narratives presented in the following section will examine multiple 
modalities of waiting and shifting temporalities within the journey to diagnosis. 
This journey was understood by participants as choosing to ‘waitand- 
see’, being made to wait or ‘time wasted’ by medical and social services. 
The following sections will present the effects of having to wait for care and 
home adaptations and how services founded on normative ideas of the lifecourse 
can impose multiplicities of waiting on people with MND.  
 
‘Waiting and seeing’ and the ‘patient’ patient 
 
Waiting, as Schweizer (2005) maintains, is universally associated with the 
negative; the idea that ‘nobody likes to wait’ may imply that waiting would 
rarely be chosen. For the most part waiting is understood as something 
enforced. From waiting for a bus to waiting in prison, it conjures a sense of 
containment and restraint placed upon you by an external force. Within 
waiting, Bissell (2007: 285) argues that agency is embodied through the 
capacity to decide upon how waiting is done. However, choosing to 
 
 
wait-and-see is a different form of waiting to being made to wait. It is a 
restriction placed from within rather than from an external force. Rather 
than an ‘empty interval between instants’ (Schweizer, 2005: 789) or ‘interstitial 
space’ (Gaspirini, 1995) it is the agentic practice in deciding how to 
continue on or what to do next, if anything. For Gasprini (1995) this is 
characterised by hope. And as Saybas¸ılı (2011: 361) writes: 
 
‘Waiting’ disturbs the passage of chronological time, and this particular interruption 
has potentiality for reevaluation beyond horizons that have been 
known. 
 
For participants experiencing early onset symptoms of MND, choosing to 
wait to see the doctor was a process actively chosen. At this stage, participants 
were in control of waiting. It allowed space for participants to decide 
that there may be nothing wrong: 
 
I noticed that when I got up in the morning my calf muscles were very tight – 
as if they had kind of shrunk in the night . . . The first few steps as I stretched 
out it was ‘‘ooh, ooh . . . But having said that I had retired from work of 
course so I wasn’t as active as I was every day so I just assumed . . . ‘‘C’mon How old are 
you?’’ ‘‘You’re sixty whatever? You’re muscles obviously are 
not going to be what they were’’. So, everything had a logical explanation. 
(Marie) 
 
For Marie, symptoms were initially constructed as being normal bodily 
signs of ageing and she waited to see her GP. The continuance of minor 
‘niggles’ and ‘twitches’ over periods of months would convince others to 
eventually see their GP. In Marie’s case this period of waiting lasted for just 
over a month: 
 
So, I left it about a month or something but then I used to think ‘‘Oh, I need 
to get off my, my feet are . . ..’’ you know how if you have been on your feet all 
day and they get really, really achy . . . that was in the June, and as I say I left it 
until about July and then at the beginning of August I thought ‘‘This is not 
going away. I’ll need to go and see . . . there’s something not right here.’’ So, 
I went away down to the doctor. (Marie) 
 
Participants chose to wait in order to garner whether there actually was a 
problem. Waiting to see if there was a problem allowed participants to have 
control over their own decision-making and, to some extent, it allowed 
them to have control over when they thought it was ‘time’ to see a 
doctor. This is reminiscent of Parsons’ (1951) notion of the ‘good’ fussfree 
‘patient’ Patient. This period of purposeful waiting was integral to 
participants’ sense of hope as it acted as the symbolic and temporal 
bridge between living everyday lives and beginning the process of waiting 
to find out what was wrong. 
 
The decision to end the period of ‘waiting and seeing’ emerged when 
symptoms began to impact on daily activities: 
 
[I] found taking notes or typing things up on the computer or whatever – this 
numbness in my right hand was beginning to cause a problem so I went and 
saw my GP. (Alex) 
 
When waiting became problematic and the experience of corporeal uncertainty 
emerged, participants then saw it necessary to seek medical advice. 
Our participants took the decision to participate in a process of waiting of a 
different sort. For most, the period of ‘waiting and seeing’ lasted for around 
three months, while for others it took up to 12 months before going to see 
a doctor. Choosing to wait offered possibility, it offered the possibility 
that there was no ill health. This period of waiting had the potential to 
be temporary, a benign period of wasted time with no truly negative 
 
 
outcome. 
 
Emotions as agentic practice 
 
Waiting can also be seen as the purposeful act of hoping; as 
Sutton et al. (2011) wrote, waiting is more than the passing of chronological 
time, it is a subjective, personal and emotional experience linked critically 
to hope. 
 
Deciding it was time to see a doctor propelled participants into a more 
protracted experience of waiting, one which removed agency and control 
from them. The period of waiting was no longer founded on potential for a 
benign outcome but increasingly became more distressing as waiting continued, 
time became stretched and waiting became ‘raw’. However this 
period of enforced waiting, whilst not within participants’ control, was 
still one in which participants could hope, and as Sutton et al. (2011: 31) 
note that ‘it is hope that makes the powerless persevere’. 
Whilst participants were initially waiting to hear back from their doctors, 
they were hopeful that through seeing the doctor they would find out nothing 
was wrong: 
 
K: So, I was saying to my friend. . . I said ‘‘I hope I don’t have some kind of 
muscle wasting disease here . . .’’. God, you know how you just say things? 
And I never meant it for a minute by the way. Anyway, so I had to go back in 
a fortnight and then I had these little tiny twitches in my thighs. Twitch 
twitch . . . you know like your muscle’s just kind of twitch twitch. I went 
back down two weeks later to get the results of the x-ray and the blood 
test, and she said to me ‘‘Well, everything is clear.’’ 
JF: That was your GP? 
K: My GP. ‘‘Everything’s clear: your blood tests are clear and your x-rays are 
clear.’’ I said ‘‘Oh, that’s great because I was beginning to get a wee bit 
worried.’’   Kay 
 
This impasse whereupon results were initially good reconfigured the process 
of waiting into one that was both useful and productive. This was the case 
for a number of participants who began their long journey to MND diagnosis 
with reassurance that nothing was wrong. Participants also discussed 
their doctors’ hopes that symptoms of MND could be attributed to more 
benign forms of illness or condition. Hoping was a co-constructed and 
inter-subjectively experienced event (Van Gennep, 1960) in which participants 
still hoped to emerge from the experience without MND but were, simultaneously, no longer a 
person without MND. 
 
And she put me through a number of tests and then they reckoned that they 
might need to . . . it might be an allergy . . . So, I had an allergy test – with all 
this pain in my back and she came back to phone me one evening to say ‘‘I 
may have good news – you may have an allergy – Cinnamon and E121 
and . . . that might be causing this problem’’ and as I later on discovered 
that she didn’t really believe that – it was a . . . a hope. Simon 
 
The temporal space imposed by waiting is filled here by emotion in stark 
contrast to Fujita’s (2002) example of waiting for the kettle to boil. The 
flood of emotion counters the notion that waiting is passive, or idle. 
 
Temporalities were multiple and layered at these points and crucially in 
conflict with one another. A week spent waiting for allergy test results or for 
‘sprained ankles’ to rectify was seen as ‘reasonable’ similarly the potential 
that symptoms may be age-related sat nicely with normative and everyday 
understandings of the progression of the life course and ‘natural’ effects 
of ageing. Whilst participants engaged in waiting and the process of 
time-stilling (Anderson, 2004), their condition was progressing and for 
some people symptoms were emerging weekly. However, as progression 
 
 
continued then waiting a month or two began to be conceptualised 
as ‘wasted time’. Time spent finding out what was wrong shifted from 
a fairly leisurely process of discovery to a much more hurried and 
worried search for an explanation. While one mode of waiting ended 
another emerged. Emotion triggered an ebb and flow of activities, hopefulness 
permitted patient waiting and anxiety punctuated and characterised 
endurance. 
 
‘Raw waiting’ as endurance 
 
As the diagnostic process continued participants began to feel that time was 
being wasted and that they were being made to wait too long to find out 
what was wrong; they simultaneously felt that this was because their symptom 
development was not being taken seriously and began to feel a sense of 
powerlessness: 
 
But we had to push and push to get appointments and to get diagnosed 
because it was just waiting a couple of months and waiting a couple of 
months and it was too much of a worry, too much of a pressure. So, we 
just kept phoning up their secretaries and everything. Just push, push, push 
to get the tests and get the results. (Charlotte, whose husband Tom 
had MND) 
 
The shift from waiting and seeing and waiting with hope to waiting without 
choice or knowledge was distressing for participants. As this process seemed 
to increasingly stretch and protract time, potential for hope simultaneously 
began to diminish. The process of waiting for a diagnosis, waiting to conduct 
tests and receive test results had a far-reaching impact on the person 
with symptoms and their families. Participants described the frustration and 
distress that their family members were going through as periods of waiting 
stretched. Crucially participants began to feel that doctors were deliberately 
delaying the process of diagnosis: 
 
So, I came off the phone and I thought, ‘‘My God, if I have to wait another 5/ 
6 months – I don’t think I will be able to walk by that time’’. . . My family and 
my daughter and that – they are cracking up. So I thought about it and I 
thought ‘‘see to tell you the truth – I don’t think that I could wait six months. 
I’m starting to get a bit panicky now.’’ (Marie) 
 
As Marie shows, not only did extensive delays in waiting to hear back from 
doctors produce distress for her and her family, it evidences multiplicities of 
temporal experience as MND continues to progress all the while. Diagnosis 
is slowed and delayed while MND progresses and the body deteriorates. 
Participants discussed the difficulty in trying to end the period of waiting by 
making appointments with their consultants. Challenging enforced waiting 
required the energy to fight for access: 
 
‘‘Well, my husband was supposed to be seeing them in three months and this is 
now six months . . .’’ and [the hospital receptionist] said ‘‘Well, the next 
appointment is in a year.’’ And I thought ‘‘Well, that’s not good enough. He 
could be dead in a year.’’ So, she phoned me back (this was the Friday) . . . oh 
she said ‘‘I can get you a private appointment with [the consultant] on Monday 
morning but it will cost you . . .’’ (I can’t remember how much – stupid money) 
and I said ‘‘Well, that’s not good enough. My husband was supposed to have 
been seen three months ago at that doctor’s request. He could be dead in a year 
and I don’t see why we should be in this position . . .’’ and she phoned me 
back . . . she then said ‘‘Well, I’ll phone back to the hospital.’’ And she called 
me back and she said ‘‘Right, you can see [the consultant] on Monday and there 
is no charge.’’ (Kate, on behalf of her husband Phillip) 
 
Kate and Philip’s example allows us to explore the relationship between 
waiting and power. Enforced waiting or being made to wait illustrates the 
 
 
structural constraints and complex relations of power manifested in the 
relationship between those that have the power to enforce waiting and 
those who endure it. As Sutton et al. (2011) describe, phrases such as ‘you snooze, you lose’ 
illustrate these normative temporal frameworks in 
modernity. Those with the power to end, limit or avoid waiting – do. 
However within the context of MND and medical institutional structures, 
for both the patient and doctor, this is not always possible. In some cases, 
consultants may have the power to end waiting for an appointment 
and in the case of Kate and her husband Phillip – didn’t until directly 
challenged. Power is associated with speed and efficiency and powerlessness 
with being made to wait; in this example the participants’ powerlessness 
in the face of a degenerative condition was furthered as it was suggested 
that the only way that their waiting would end was if they sought private 
healthcare at a cost. Thus not waiting or a refusal to wait might also 
necessitate wealth or financial resources. In Kate and Phillip’s 
example the result of having to wait the extra year for a consultation 
potentially meant that Phillip would not be alive by that point in time. 
Participants’ feelings about waiting and the prospect of time running out 
as the reality of a negative outcome comes to the fore is in tension with the 
fact that medical professionals are constrained by the need to provide 
accurate diagnoses which also take time, resources and planning. At the 
centre of this tension is the interplay between various agents’ experiences of 
time in conflict within the context of a gaining an accurate and efficient 
diagnosis. 
 
The experience of enforced waiting for a diagnosis also delayed advice 
about how to deal with symptoms. 
 
I’d asked [the neurological consultant] when he still thought it wasn’t 
MND, ‘‘What should I do? Exercise?’’ He told me that until we had a clear 
diagnosis that we should just carry on as normal but now I’ve wasted a year. 
(Sharon) 
 
Sharon was looking for ways to alleviate or ameliorate symptoms of MND 
in the meantime in order to make her period of waiting more bearable, as 
something that she could assert control over. However she was encouraged 
to wait, by her consultant, ‘as normal’ without trying to improve her symptoms 
in the waiting period. As such she felt that the time waiting was ‘time 
wasted’ because it was unproductive and that she passive and unable to 
assert her agency in waiting. 
 
The effect of this process of diagnosis created a sense of dread for participants 
as ongoing tests returned negative results and the balance tipped 
increasingly from hope to despair. After long periods of waiting, for some 
up to two years, participants received their diagnoses of MND. However, 
for some the delivery of diagnosis was delayed because their consultants 
demonstrated distress at having to give a diagnosis of a terminal condition and so rescinded 
the diagnosis of MND: 
 
M: So, it was a morning appointment so by about two o’clock Claire had got 
herself in a state worrying about me so she phoned him back . . . So, she said 
‘‘I am going to phone him up and see what he said to you’’ 
JF: Oh, so she wasn’t with you? 
M: Oh yes she was with me but she wasn’t with me in the room when I was being 
assessed . . . She was in the waiting room you see . . . So, he got quite upset, the 
[Consultant], to be fair to him . . . he said ‘‘Tell [Mike] not to worry – it is 
probably not Motor Neurone . . . in fact, I am 90% sure that it is trapped 
nerves . . .’’ (Mike) 
 
Mike waited another six months to get a definitive diagnosis of MND: time 
was stretched even further as a diagnosis was withdrawn. The consultant 
offered Mike false hope. This suggests that the consultant may have 
 
 
believed that this period of waiting and hoping was a more desirable 
state to be in than accepting a diagnosis of MND. Either the consultant 
was themselves still hopeful and in the ‘wait and see’ phase, or they needed 
to take time to be absolutely sure of their diagnosis, or were not always 
sensitive to the effects of ‘raw waiting’. Insensitivity to the endurance experienced 
by patients may have been unintentional on the consultant’s part, but 
it was nevertheless felt as a destructive force. While MND itself enforced a 
process of waiting out of doctors’ control, structural issues around delayed 
appointments and poor communication could have minimised periods of 
distress and of ‘raw waiting’. 
 
Waiting and social worth: Social services 
 
The post-diagnosis period saw another shift in how temporality was understood. 
While the pre-diagnosis period of waiting was focused on gaining a 
diagnosis, waiting to find out what was wrong through waiting by choice 
and enforced waiting, the post-diagnostic period saw ‘time left’ (to live) as 
incredibly precious (Abbott and Carpenter, 2014). Not only was this time 
spent trying to reconstruct a sense of self and identity as a person, now with 
MND, but with diagnosis came the ability to initiate access to services (both 
care and social) that mediated and managed the ‘time left’; participants now 
had to negotiate MND with a new set of social structures. This final section 
examines the experience of waiting for social care and services. 
 
From our analysis of the diagnostic process we saw participants employ 
a ‘patience as a virtue’ strategy, called upon to challenge rising anxieties and 
fears as muscle weakness persisted. As symptoms progressed and the home 
became more inaccessible, the families we spoke to became constrained by 
the inadequacies of their physical spaces affecting their wellbeing. 
Professionals like social workers and occupational therapists (OT) 
became instrumental in aiding participants in this period post-diagnosis 
providing home adaptations, mobility aids and other equipment. As with 
diagnosis, participants started off patiently waiting for support, and then 
endured the absence of action: again waiting became ‘raw’ (Sutton et al., 
2011). Critically, waiting was experienced differently as time post-diagnosis 
became precious, pressured and finite. Participants and their families were 
acutely aware of the value of the time left for them: 
 
You know we had thirteen different [professionals] in the house one Friday 
morning, and I just thought you know . . . time is precious and you need to 
have time together without all these people.  
(Maggie, whose husband Derek had MND)  
 
Linked to this idea of the finitude of time, Kay discussed how time was 
eroded by waiting for support, and how this impacted on well-being. 
 
Well, they’ve never ever, never have I phoned and they have phoned back. 
I can guarantee you that I would need to phone again. So, [the OT] never 
phoned back of course so the next day, phones again ‘‘Oh, she’ll be in at lunch 
time.’’ So I phone back and I phoned back and said ‘‘Oh, it’s Mrs Campbell, I 
was just wondering about the stuff you were going to get and nothing has 
arrived.’’ ‘‘Eh, what was it again?’’ Kay 
 
Kay was not only made to wait for the necessary equipment but she was 
dismissed or ignored. This kind of perceived banal bureaucratic waiting, in 
the context of having MND, had detrimental affects on her self-esteem and 
sense of social value and worth. Further, her corporeal decline was not 
taken into consideration: 
 
K: Any approaches have come from us to them. She [OT] has never phoned me 
and said ‘‘How are you now? Will I come up and see if there is any other thing 
 
 
that you are needing?’’ 
JF: So, how long ago was the assessment when she came in here? 
K:Oh, last year. 
JF: So, everything [in relation to mobility] has changed since then. 
K:She’s never been back. Absolutely. 
Kay 
 
Firstly, Kay becomes exasperated with waiting on top of dealing with 
muscle weakness. Secondly waiting for resolution became redundant as 
her body and needs changed. There is a degree of constraint (of time and 
of money) on OTs to respond urgently to all requests. Waiting is a structural 
issue as average waiting times come into conflict with the temporal 
dimensions of MND. OT structures were more suited to static conditions 
and failed to respond to MND’s constant progression. The impact of waiting 
made Kay, and others feel powerless as their homes became inaccessible. 
The energy exerted to manage these periods of waiting not only led to 
feelings of diminished social value and power, in turn, more energy was 
required to challenge having to wait. 
 
Paul and Rachael fell into a funding gap. The family was considered low 
priority or non-‘emergencies’ (Zerubavel, 1987). When a local authority 
considers major adaptations to a home, they impose a five-year rule on 
the property to ensure their investment is fully utilised. The five-year rule 
pertains to the receiver of the adaption to remain in their home for five 
years in order for the adaptation to be justified. The five-year rule could be 
enacted in different ways, one way is to prevent people from moving out of 
their property into another property that then needs a similar level of adaptation 
(and another investment) but has been interpreted to mean that the 
person who requires the adaptation must make five years use of it, and if the 
person has a terminal illness where end of life may occur before this five 
years then they may become exempt: 
 
When [Rachel] was first diagnosed . . . em . . . it wasn’t good at all. We had a 
terrible run in with . . . we had wanted a stair lift fitted and they wouldn’t do it. 
Despite being approached by the MSP and everything, they wouldn’t do it 
. . .eh . . . 
JF: And what reason did they give? 
They didn’t think basically . . . and again this 5 year thing came into the equation 
. . . to cut a long story short they basically didn’t think they would get 
their money’s worth out of it. 
(Paul, whose wife Rachel had MND) 
 
The old adage that ‘time is money’ has particular salience in this example 
(Schweizer, 2008). The fact that adapting Rachel and Paul’s home was not 
seen as ‘worth the money’ because the family wouldn’t get enough use out 
of it evidences the moral worth placed on time and use/productivity. Not 
only were they made to wait but they were denied what they needed because their time left 
was not seen as worth the economic investment. Being made 
to wait for an accessible bathroom again exacerbated this powerlessness 
and feelings of low value: 
 
We had to fight, fight for a wet floor shower room to the extent of ‘‘Well, 
you’re not entitled’’ Based on what? I had people say to my face about that. 
I’ve also had people say to my face ‘‘Well, he’s not got cancer so we’ve not got 
all of these things in place. I actually said to them, ‘‘So you’re actually grading 
life limiting illness now are you?’’ I said that to them and there was silence. 
(Nadine, whose brother Laurence had MND) 
 
Both Nadine and Paul argued that they had no power. Accessing their 
home, and access to hygiene and comfort was not seen as sufficiently 
worth the investment of social services. Despite receiving a diagnosis of 
MND, this did not automatically legitimate participants. The diagnosis 
didn’t make them eligible for support without significant difficulty and 
 
 
once again enforced ‘raw waiting’ (Sutton et al., 2011). The barriers 
imposed by professionals’ conduct, and bureaucracy, impacted on quality 
of life left. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper has outlined the multiple modalities and scales of waiting for 
people with MND. Further, it has sought to examine the ambivalence 
placed upon ‘waiting’ and to challenge the passivity ascribed to it. It has 
critically challenged the notion that waiting is ‘dead time’, or unproductive 
time experienced universally. As outlined in this paper, waiting is a universal 
experience in the sense that everybody waits and the experiences of that 
waiting are varied and multiple. While not useful to hierarchise scales of 
waiting, it is important to unpack what waiting means and how it is experienced 
in different social and corporeal contexts. 
 
Waiting with MND was found to be a distinct and unique experience due 
to multiple modes of waiting. Like most chronic and terminal illness, MND 
upset normative assumptions about chronological time in relation to the life 
course. The temporal nature and progression of the condition itself along 
with the structural implications of diagnostic delay produces a sort of waiting 
that challenges the ‘modern’ preoccupation of waiting as ambivalent or 
banal. Time stilled and stretched in the face of protracted periods of waiting 
for a diagnosis in contrast to the rapid, unwitting and disabling progression 
of symptoms. 
 
This study found that choice played a key role in how waiting was 
endured and managed. Waiting was initially entered into by choice by the 
participants. The mode of waiting was understood as ‘waiting and seeing’ 
that resulted in hopefulness and potential for a benign outcome. This period 
was also a period of patience as participants wanted to be seen to be ‘good 
patients’ willing to wait. 
 
The often rapid and ongoing progression of symptoms unsettling daily 
life and events initiated a different sort of waiting – one of endurance. This 
came into conflict with structural delays imposed upon them by GPs, 
Consultants and, latterly, social services. Managing waiting was also the 
exercise of managing anxiety, fear and distress as well as the reality of 
corporeal degeneration. The production of intense emotion and powerlessness 
rendered these protracted periods of endured waiting as anything but 
ambivalent or passive. Doctors’ decisions to protract periods of testing 
without informing participants as to why, and decisions to rescind diagnoses 
left participants feeling of less social value and worth, of lower status 
than those who could enforce waiting – waiting became demeaning 
(Comfort, 2008). Such experiences of powerlessness and being a low priority 
were echoed post-diagnosis, a period where participants should have been 
seen as ‘legitimate’ yet their ‘eligibility’ was still questioned by social care 
professionals. Despite time now being prognosed as finite, waiting was still 
enforced, and endured by participants. 
 
The people with MND who participated experienced different modalities 
of waiting depending on what was waited for. MND in itself was found 
to produce powerlessness and distress as it progressed week-by-week, 
month-by-month however, critically endured raw waiting could have been 
minimised by less protracted journeys to diagnosis and by appropriate 
measures taken by social and care services. 
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